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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20150015-CA
MATTHEW JAMES HINMON,
Apellant is not incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
As required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24( c), this reply brief is "limited
to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." The brief does not restate
arguments from the opening brief or address matters that do not merit reply.
ARGUMENT

I. The Trial Court's Ruling Contains Four Clearly Erroneous Findings of Fact.
The State argues that "the evidence considered by the trial court was more than
sufficient to support" the challenged findings of fact. Appellee's Br. 11-16. In doing so, it
suggests that a trial court's findings are adequately supported and not clearly erroneous
"when the record contains some evidence supporting them." Appellee' s Br. 12, 15
(emphasis in original) (citing State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r 13, 20 P.3d 300; State v. Cecil,
2012 UT App 280, ,rs, 288 P.3d 22). But this is an incorrect formulation of the clearly
erroneous standard. Rather, overturning findings as clearly erroneous is required in cases

where "'although there is evidence to support it,"' In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ,r38, 147 P.3d
401, the finding is "against the clear weight of the evidence" or the appellate court is left
with "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Brown v. State, 2013
UT 42, ,r37, 308 P.3d 486.
The State cites Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r13, and Cecil, 2012 UT App 280, ,rs, to
support the proposition that a finding is not clearly erroneous when the record includes

"some evidence" supporting it. The discussions cited in these cases, however, concern the
standard relevant to review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss and a jury
verdict-not a trial court's findings of fact. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r13 ("We will uphold
the trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury if, upon reviewing the evidence and
all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some

evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Cecil, 2012 UT App 280, ,rs (same). Indeed, "whether the findings were made
by a judge or by a jury ... [is a] distinction [that] matters." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ,r35.

"An appellate court must indulge findings of fact made by a jury that support the
verdict," but "[n]o such indulgence is required of findings made by a judge." Id.
"[ i]t is not accurate to say that the appellate court takes that view of the
evidence that is most favorable to the appellee, that it assumes that all
conflicts in the evidence were resolved in his favor, and that he must be
given the benefit of all favorable inferences. All of this is true in reviewing
a jury verdict. It is not true when it is findings of the court that are being
reviewed."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Instead, when reviewing the trial court's factual findings, this Court looks to "the
entire factual record." Id. ,r,r38-39. It determines that "'[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,"' Id. if38
(emphasis added), or concludes that the finding is "against the clear weight of the
evidence." Brown, 2013 UT 42, if37. Thus, contrary to the State's suggestion, a trial
court's factual finding may be clearly erroneous even ifthere is "some evidence"
supporting it. And for the reasons outlined in the opening brief, the challenged findings
were against the clear weight of the evidence and therefore, clearly erroneous even
though "some evidence" might have been consistent with them. See Appellant's Br. 1115; see also, e.g., R.284:16, 20, 32-33; 285:6-8, 12-15; Appellant's Br. 13-15 ("the clear
weight of the evidence shows that Matthew told the driver to 'just drive" and "take off'
and reached towards the gearshift after Loken reached into the car to restrain Matthew's
hands" even though some of Worthington's evidentiary hearing testimony could be
construed to support the trial court's finding to the contrary). 1

1

The State indicates in a footnote that "Officer Loken's witness statement, which was
relied on by the trial court in its Ruling" is "[n]otably missing from the record."
Appellee's Br. 3 n.1. Nevertheless, the State does not seem to take issue with the
omission of this witness statement or rely on its absence to support any of its arguments.
But even if it did, the trial court commented on the "brevity of Officer Loken' s
handwritten statement," finding that Loken's "testimony d[id] not 'conflict' with the
written statement as much as it expand[ed] upon it." R.172-73. The trial court's finding
indicates that Loken's witness statement was generally consistent with Loken's
testimony, but did not provide details beyond what he testified to. In any event, Loken's
witness statement, unlike the statements of Raines and Worthington, was never offered or
received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, and it was improper for the trial court to
3

II. Loken lacked reasonable suspicion when he performed an investigatory
detention of Hinmon.
The State argues that Raines' s tip gave Loken reasonable suspicion to detain
Hinmon because Raines' s status as an identified citizen informant rendered his report
"highly reliable" along with the report's detail and timing. Appellee's Br. 22-24. It also
maintains that Raines and Loken had a sufficient basis of knowledge for concluding that
the balloons were associated with illegal drug activity. Id. at 24-27. Lastly, the State
claims that the details of Raines' s report were corroborated and "nothing Loken observed
2

served to dispel [his] report." Id. at 22-24. These arguments fail.
First, the State overemphasizes the importance of Raines's status as an identified
citizen informant in determining the reliability of the tip in this case. This is because it
fails to draw a distinction between two different types of citizen informant tips: (1) tips
about criminal activity that is readily identifiable to the general public and (2) tips about
criminal activity that does not "fall within the realm of knowledge common to members
of the public." State v. Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, ifif15-17, 263 P.3d 557. Without more, a
citizen informant's tip concerning the latter is not as reliable as the former. See id.
For instance, in Lloyd, a tipster reported to the police that individuals parked in a
green car behind her building were "smoking drugs." Id. at ,r2. Even though this Court

independently rely on materials outside of the evidence. R.57-58; 284. Hence, the fact
that Loken' s witness statement is not part of the record is irrelevant to this appeal.
2

The State argues that "[t]he reliability and veracity of Raines['s] tip alone created
reasonable suspicion." Appellee's Br. 24. Although it claims that "Loken's own
observations added to that suspicion," it does not point to any additional facts known to
Loken that added to the information already provided in the tip. See id. 23-24.

4

found the tipster to be more akin to "a disinterested 'citizen-informant,"' it concluded that
her report alone did not support reasonable suspicion. Id. at ,rip6-17. In doing so, it
distinguished between citizen informant tips about readily identifiable criminal activity
and citizen informant tips about criminal activity that does not "fall within the realm of
knowledge common to members of the public." Id. at ,rt 7.
This Court explained that a "citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is
sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in
criminal behavior, i.e., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's
conclusion is not fully explained." Id. But unlike criminal activities like drunk drivingwhich are readily observable and therefore, more reliable because the basis of the
tipster's knowledge is apparent- "whether a person is 'smoking drugs' does not seem to
fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public." Id. Because this
Court lacked "enough information before [it] to determine whether the informant had a
sufficient basis of knowledge for concluding that the occupants of the car were 'smoking
drugs,"' it was "unable to conclude that the informant's tip, by itself, supported a
reasonable suspicion or probable cause determination." Id.
Thus, if a report concerns criminal activity outside the public's common
knowledge and an adequate basis for the tipster's conclusions is lacking, the report alone
does not furnish reasonable suspicion-even if the tipster is a citizen informant. That
was the case here.
Raines told Loken and Worthington that "he thought [there might be] a drug
transaction ... going on" in a vehicle in the parking lot. R.284:6, 29-30, 37; 285:3. He
5

said he stared at the vehicle's occupants because he thought they appeared suspicious and
the passenger gave Raines a '"what are you looking at' kind of a look." R.177; 284:29;
285:4. Raines said he saw a towel on the passenger's lap with pink balloons on it and the
passenger was "fiddling" with the balloons. R.177; 284:29.
Although Raines was an identified citizen informant, recognizing whether a drug
transaction was occurring and making the association between balloons and drugs "does
not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public."

Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, ,II 7. And as argued in Hinmon's opening brief, Raines's
report failed to reveal a sufficient basis of knowledge for concluding that the occupants of
the car were engaged in drug activity; it did not contain any "indication ... as to why"
he believed that the balloons were associated with drugs "as opposed to" some other
lawful purpose. Id.; Appellant's Br. 17-20. Thus, where the nature of the criminal activity
fell outside the public's common knowledge and the record fails to demonstrate a
sufficient basis of knowledge for Raines's conclusions, Raines's status as an identified
citizen informant does not render his report "highly reliable" and supportive of
reasonable suspicion.
Nonetheless, the State argues that Raines and Loken had a sufficient basis of
knowledge for concluding that the balloons were associated with criminal activity.
Appellee's Br. 24-27. First, it contends that Hinmon "failed to show" that Raines's
previous citation for marijuana paraphernalia and his '"watching TV, court TV, anything
like that'" "is not enough to support that he knew that he was witnessing a drug
transaction." Id. at 24-25. However, it is not Hinmon's burden to demonstrate that
6

Raines's report, which law enforcement relied upon in carrying out the detention,
revealed a sufficient basis of knowledge to support Raines's conclusions. Rather, "[i]t has
long been the law that once a defendant adequately challenges a warrantless seizure, the
State bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of law enforcement's action." State

v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, if39, 164 P.3d 397. Because Hinmon raised an adequate Fourth
Amendment challenge, the burden falls on the State to demonstrate that law enforcement
acted reasonably by relying on Raines's report. See id. (defendant satisfied his initial
burden where he challenged the "constitutionality of the initial stop, as well as the scope
of the stop, and supported that challenge with factual reference"); see also R.31-33, 6477; 283:3-7 (arguments in support of motion to suppress).
In any event, Raines's evidentiary hearing testimony regarding his experience with
drugs-a previous citation for marijuana paraphernalia and "watching TV, court TV,
anything like that"-should not weigh into this Court's determination regarding the
reliability of his tip. "[W]hether reasonable suspicion exists [is] based upon the facts
known to the police officer at the time of the" detention. State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63,
if l 7, 194 P .3d 925 (emphasis added). However, nothing in the record indicates that Loken
was aware ofRaines's experience with drugs at the time of the detention. Cf State v.

Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, ,r,r3, 13, 69 P.3d 293 (concluding that a tipster's report
of "a baggie with white powder ... that [he] believed to be drugs" was reliable where the
record revealed that the tipster previously helped the arresting officer effectuate at least
one drug arrest and had a history of giving reliable information to the officer). Thus,
because this evidence was presented at an evidentiary hearing months "after the
7

[detention]," it "cannot be considered." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138 n.6 (Utah
1994); see also Salt Lake City v. Street., 2011 UT App 111, if15 n.1, 251 P.3d 862; Salt

Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, if l 7 n.4, 177 P.3d 655.
The State also relies on the assumption that Loken and Raines, "would know that
[heroin] is trafficked in balloons and would be able to identify that the circumstances here
involved a drug deal" because it "is part of the main-stream popular culture." Appellee's
Br. 26. And while the State acknowledges that "Loken did not specifically testify about
his training and experience with drugs," it urges this Court to assume that his "veteran
status" as a peace officer with the Division of Wildlife Resources and his completion of
POST training furnished him with the experience to recognize that drugs were involved.

Id. at 26-27. However, nothing in the record indicates that, at the time of the detention,
Raines or Loken were aware that heroin is kept in balloons or that the balloon contained
contraband. See DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289,291 {Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (rejecting
the State's contention that "it is a well known fact that heroin is kept in balloons" because
the "burden was on the State to show facts authorizing the seizure" and the record did not
contain "evidence that the officer knew what the State now alleges in its brief on appeal
is a 'well known' fact."); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 740-41 (Alaska 1979)
(concluding that seizure and search was not supported by the probable cause required by
the plain view exception where the "record simply d[id] not support a conclusion that the
incriminating nature of the balloon was immediately apparent to the correctional officer
prior to the seizure and search challenged").
The burden is on the State to show reasonableness "[a]nd a dearth of evidence
8

cannot be assumed to support the reasonableness of an officer's actions during an
investigative detention." Won-vood, 2007 UT 47, if40 "Such an assumption turns this
well-established proof requirement on its head." Id. Thus, the State's assumptions
regarding the ability of Raines and Loken to recognize drug activity must be rejected
because the record fails to adequate! y support them.
Finally, the State argues that the reliability of Raines's report was supported by
Loken's corroboration. Citing Alabama v. Wh,ite, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), for the
proposition that officer corroboration of innocent details may render a tip reliable, the
State maintains that "[i]t is immaterial that Loken did not see the balloons" where he
verified the innocent details supplied by Raines. Appellee's Br. 23-24. But the innocent
details provided by the tipster in Wlzite, which were ultimately corroborated by the police,
pertained to the defendant's future movements that the "general public would have had
no way of knowing." Wh,ite, 496 U.S. at 331-32. The court distinguished these details
from those "[a]nyone could have 'predicted,'" explaining that "[w]hat was important" to
the reliability calculation "was the caller's ability to predict respondent'sfuture behavior,
because it demonstrated inside information-a special familiarity with respondent's
affairs." Id. at 332 (emphasis in original). In this case, however, Loken's corroboration
contributed little, if anything, to the reliability of Raines's tip because the details he
corroborated were innocent and did not relate to Hinmon' s future behavior. See id.; see
also Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, ,r17 n.2 (concluding that the tip regarding drug activity did

not provide reasonable suspicion where the record provided "no basis to conclude that
[the tipster] was 'qualified to know' the smell of drugs," even though the officers
9

corroborated innocents details, such as the presence of "a small, green car containing
three occupants" where the tipster described).
In short, the State's arguments are unpersuasive and fail to demonstrate that Loken
acted with reasonable suspicion.

III. Loken lacked probable cause when he arrested Hinmon.
The State also fails to meet its burden of demonstrating that Loken acted with
probable cause. According to the State, Loken's decision to arrest Hinmon was justified
by: (1) the exigent circumstances exception (2) probable cause that Hinmon interfered
with an arresting officer; and (3) probable cause that there was "a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime" would be in the car. Appellee's Br. 29-34. These
arguments are unconvincing.
First, as a threshold matter, the State is incorrect in stating the evidence available
to Loken at the time of the arrest. As argued, the trial court's finding that Hinmon
reached for the gearshift and told the driver to 'just drive" before Loken effected the
arrest was clearly erroneous. Appellant's Br. 13-15; R.284:16, 20, 32-33; 285:6-8, 12-15;
Defendant's Ex. B. This remains true even though "some evidence," i.e. Worthington's
evidentiary hearing testimony, could be construed to support the trial court's finding; the
clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that Hinmon told the driver to 'just drive" and
reached towards the gearshift after Loken reached into the car to restrain his hands. See

id.; supra Part I. Thus, contrary to the State's suggestion, this Court should not consider
Hinmon's comments to the driver to 'just drive" and his reaching for the gearshift
because these facts were not available to Loken at the time of the arrest. See Lloyd, 2011

10

UT App 323, ,Il 1 ("'[ w ]hether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of
the arrest."').
Moreover, the State's arguments fail to demonstrate that Loken was justified in
effecting the arrest. First, the State claims that "Loken's actions were justified under the
exigent circumstances exception," arguing that his "only option was to seize Defendant to
prevent the destruction of evidence and flight of Defendant." Appellee's Br. 33-34. This
argument presupposes that Loken had probable cause to arrest Hinmon. Indeed, in the
automobile context, warrantless searches and seizures require a showing of both exigent
circumstances and probable cause-the critical ingredient lacking in this case. State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 (Utah 1996); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,411
(Utah 1984) ("the police must have probable cause to believe that the automobile
contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if not
immediately seized"); see also Appellant's Br. 22-28.
Nevertheless, the State contends that Loken' s arrest was supported by probable
cause that Hinmon committed Interference with an Arresting Officer in violation of Utah
Code§ 76-8-305(2). 3 See Appellee's Br. 30-31. Pointing to State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97,
3

Under section 76-8-305(2), a person commits interference with an Arresting Officer
ifhe has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge,
that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or
another and interferes with the arrest or detention by ...
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention.

11

57 P.3d 1052, it claims that Hinmon "interfer[ed] with a lawful detention" by disobeying
Loken's order not to move and throwing the towel to the ground. Appellee's Br. 30-31.
This argument fails.
Hinmon's act of passively pushing a towel from his lap to the floor after Loken
ordered him not to move, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, did not give Loken
probable cause to make an arrest. Because reasonable suspicion was lacking, see
Appellant's Br. 16-22; supra Part II, Loken's order was not a lawful order, and Hinmon's
peaceful noncompliance did not constitute a violation of the interfering statute that
furnished probable cause. Although Trane explains that "the lawfulness of an officer's
order or arrest is not determinative of whether an officer is authorized to arrest an
individual under the interfering statute," the court was clear that its "opinion [wa]s
limited to the facts of [that] case:" a defendant who was lawfully detained after he
committed public intoxication in the officers' presence; a lawful order requesting that the
defendant submit to a frisk; and a defendant who physically resisted that order. 2002 UT
97, ,r,r31, 35-36 & n.4. In support of its reasoning, the court emphasized that "in Utah
there is no right to physically resist either an arrest or an order of the police, irrespective
/-

~

of the legality of the arrest or order, so long as the officers are within the scope of their
authority." Id. at if33. However, it did not address whether a defendant's passive
noncompliance with an officer's unlawful order justifies an arrest under the interfering
statute. See id.
Courts in other jurisdictions have considered this issue. For instance, in State v.
Bishop, the defendant "peacefully resisted the unlawful frisk by merely turning around
12

and telling [the officer] 'no."' 203 P.3d 1203, 1220 (Idaho 2009). The Idaho Supreme
Court rejected the State's argument that "'willful resistance, delay or obstruction to even
an unlawful search or seizure constitutes an independent crime for which a defendant
may be lawfully arrested."' Id. at 1217 n.11. In its analysis, the court drew a distinction
between forceful resistance and peaceful noncompliance, which "does not raise the same
concerns for public safety." Id. at 1216-20 & n.16. It further explained:
'~

If individuals could be arrested for peacefully resisting an unlawful frisk, an
officer could order anyone on the street to submit to a frisk and, if the
person merely answered "no," the officer could arrest him or her for
resisting and conduct a search incident to arrest. This would give officers
an incentive to violate the constitution. It would also punish individuals for
asserting their constitutional rights.

Id. at 1220 n.16.
Accordingly, the court held that because the execution of an unlawful frisk was
outside the scope of the police officer's duties, the defendant's peaceful resistance to the
frisk did not furnish "probable cause to arrest [the defendant] for obstructing an officer."

Id. at 1220 4 ; see also, e.g., Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 841 (9th

4

The Bishop court's holding was unchanged by the fact that the defendant physically
struggled with the officer when he was being handcuffed. The court explained that
because "the struggle took place after [the officer] decided to arrest [the defendant] for
resisting the frisk," it was "irrelevant in determining whether [the defendant's] resistance
to the frisk was lawful." Bishop, 203 P.3d at 1220 n.17 (emphasis in original). Likewise,
Hinmon' s physical struggles after Loken restrained him should not be considered in the
probable case determination or in determining the propriety ofHinmon's noncompliance
with Loken's orders. See Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, ,Il 1; Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138 n.6.
And the State's arguments to the contrary should be rejected. See Appellee's Br. 31
(arguing that Hinmon' s continued "resist[ ance ]" and attempts to eat the balloon "after
Loken restrained [him]," were "facts [that] provided Loken further probable cause to
arrest").

13

Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of
Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).

Similar considerations and concerns warrant the same result here. Where Loken
exceeded the scope of his authority by detaining Hinmon without reasonable suspicion,
Hinmon did not violate the interfering statute by peacefully disobeying Loken's unlawful
orders. Hinmon' s act of pushing the towel to the ground after Loken told him not to move
could not furnish probable cause because the detention he peacefully resisted was
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, the State maintains that "the totality of the circumstances
establish[ed] probable cause [that Hinmon was engaged in illegal drug activity]: Raines's
tip, Loken's observations, Defendant's immediate attempt to conceal the towel and its
contents, Defendant's frantic reaction to Loken-yelling at the driver to 'just drive."'
Appellee's Br. 31-33. The State's view of the totality of the circumstances, however, is
not confined to "the facts known to the police officer at the time of the" arrest. Applegate,
2008 UT 63, ,r17. As discussed, Hinmon reacted by trying to reach for the gearshift and
telling the driver to 'just drive" after Loken effected the arrest. Appellant's Br. 13-15;
R.284:16, 20, 32-33; 285:6-8, 12-15; Defendant's Ex. B. Moreover Loken only witnessed
Hinmon push the towel that was on his lap to the ground without observing any of "its
contents." See R.284: 16, 20, 32; 285:5-6. He did not observe the "contents" or what those
contents were until after the arrest. See id.
When the evidence is properly viewed along with the reasons stated in Hinmon's
opening brief, the totality of the facts known to Loken at the time of the arrest-Raines
14

tip, Loken's own observations, and Hinmon's throwing the towel to the ground-did not
furnish him with probable cause to believe that Hinmon was engaged in illegal drug
activity. See Appellant's Br. 22-28; see also supra Part II. Thus, Loken's arrest of
Hinmon was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and the evidence seized pursuant to
that unlawful arrest should have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and in the opening brief, Hinmon asks this Court to reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
SUBMITTED this 2nd day of November, 2015.
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